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VOLUME XXII JUNE, 1953 NUMIIBER 2
SUBSEQUENT ORAL PROMISE TO PERFORM
ANOTHER'S DUTY AND THE NEW YORK
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
FRANCIS X. CONWAYt
T HE New York Court of Appeals is one of limited jurisdiction,' its
principal function being not so much to decide individual contro-
versies as to establish the law of the state for the guidance of the
lower courts and the legal profession.2 In the limited field of the law
with which this paper deals the efforts of the court to perform its prin-
cipal function, while frequent and strenuous, do not appear to have met
with outstanding success.
Thirty-three years ago Professor Burdick 3 pointed to the confusion
and uncertainty in the opinions of the New York Court of Appeals
dealing with the applicability of the New York Statute of Frauds to
oral promises to perform the pre-existing duty of another. Despite the
fact that the intervening years since Professor Burdick wrote on the
subject have furnished the Court of Appeals with several oppportunities'
to clarify the law on the subject, one finds it difficult, if not impossible,
on the basis of the opinions of the court, to state precisely what the law
is today on the enforceability of such oral promises to perform an-
other's antecedent duty. Not that the court has not tried. The court
has certainly striven to announce a definite principle for future guid-
ance and has succeeded in deciding, with fairly constant unanimity
among the members of the court, the individual controversies presented
to it with a very definite consistency in result.'
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. N. Y. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 7; Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation, Ltd. v. Otis
Elevator Company, 291 N.Y. 254, 52 N.E. 2d 421 (1943); Charles W. Sommer & Bros. Inc.
v. Albert Lorsch & Co., 254 N.Y. 146, 172 N.E. 271 (1930).
2. Cohen and Karger, THE Pow-as or T= NEW Yo x CouRT or APPEA § 3, p. 16
(1952).
3. Burdick, Suretyship and The Statute of Frauds, 20 COL. L. REV. 153 (1920).
4. Such opportunities were presented in Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al.,
257 N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931) and Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et at., 289 N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.
2d 398 (1942).
5. White v. Rintoul, 108 N.Y. 222, I5 N.E. 318 (1888); see text accompanying note
42 infra.
6. The Court of Appeals has almost invariably held the oral promises to be unenforce-
able. See note 43 infra.
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Nevertheless, the law on the subject remains confused. Indeed it
may be said that whatever confusion existed thirty-three years ago
has in the intervening years become to some extent more confounded.
That, over the years, the Court of Appeals has been conscious of the
uncertain state of the law on the enforceability of the oral promises
involved and of the lack of success of its own previous attempts to an-
nounce a fairly definite principle of law, which might be understood
and applied with some degree of certitude, is readily apparent from
the court's own repeated attempts to restate, clarify and to sum up its
previous pronouncements, to explain and modify the language of its
prior opinions and to lay down, at least in dicta, rules for future appli-
cation.
These strivings appear not to have borne fruit. So far as mere
language goes, it is true we are left with an oft-quoted statement of the
applicable rule of law. Unfortunately the true meaning and application
of that rule appear to be incapable of satisfactory understanding and
definition. In fact the most recent decisions of the court make it uncer-
tain whether the announced rule now really means what it appears
to say.
THE PROBLEM
The problem which we will consider involves essentially the question
whether a person may by oral promise become originally liable for the
same antecedent debt for which another person continues also to remain
liable to the same creditor. A negative answer to that question pre-
sents an easy and complete solution to the problem. An affirmative
answer raises the difficulty which has plagued the Court of Appeals
and which the court has recognized may never be satisfactorily re-
solved. This is the conclusion of the court itself.
"When, by some authorities, it was said that a verbal promise to pay the debt
of another was always collateral and invalid if the primary debt continued to
exist concurrently with the promise, a simple and easy test was furnished to deter-
mine whether the statute did or did not apply. But when that test was discarded,
and it became the law that a promise to pay another's debt might be original, al-
though that debt subsisted, and was in no manner extinguished, the presence of
such continued liability raised a cloud of doubt and ambiguity which, perhaps,
will never be entirely dissipated." 7
The pertinent provision of the New York Statute of Frauds is simple
enough:
"Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void,8 unless it or some note or
7. White v. Rintoul, 108 N.Y. 222, 224, 15 N.E. 318, 319 (1888).
8. Although the New York statute uses the word "void" the view of the New York
courts is that the oral agreement is valid and only becomes unenforceable when the de-
[Vol. 22
THE NEW YORK STATUTE OF FRAUDS
memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged
therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or understanding; ... 2.
Is a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person; . . .9
However, this simple provision has, perhaps by reason of its very sim-
plicity, been the source both in New York and in other jurisdictions of
many and varied interpretations.
There are a number of "exceptions" to the quoted provisions of
the Statute of Frauds, some merely apparent1 0 and others apparently
real.' One exception to the literal language of the Statute, generally
recognized outside of New York, is the so-called "main purpose rule.'
2
That rule applies under certain circumstances where a promisor (S)
Orally promises the promisee (C) to perform the antecedent duty of
another person (P), such as to pay P's pre-existing debt to C.
If New York applied the main purpose rule or an equivalent rule,
as such rules are generally although not uniformly applied in other
jurisdictions, there would be less reason for the discussions we are now
embarked upon. New York, without explicitly referring to the main
purpose rule as such, has in effect applied its underlying principle in
a few limited instances.' 3 However, the New York Court of Appeals
fendant raises the point that it is oral. Crane v. Powell, 139 N.Y. 379, 34 N.E. 911
(1893); Sanger v. French, 157 N.Y. 213, 51 N.E. 979 (1893). See Beau v. Flint, 204 N.Y.
153, 161, 97 N.E. 490 (1912).
9. N.Y. PEns. Paop. LAW § 31. The New York statute, like those of the other states,
is derived from the original English statute, 29 Car. II, § 4.
10. The Statute of Frauds, by its literal language, applies only to the promise of a surety,
ie., one who is promising to perform another's duty. Where actually the promisor is not
a surety but an original promisor promising to perform his own duty, the Statute does
not apply; for example, where no credit has been extended to the other person to whom
the promisee has delivered goods or rendered services (Drummond v. Pillsbury, 130 Me.
406, 156 At. 806 (1931)), or where for some other reason that other prson is not liable
(Mease v. Wagner, 1 McCord 395 (S.C. 1821)).
11. Within this category may be included decisions holding the Statute inapplicable
where the oral promise is made to a person other than the creditor such as Eastvwood v.
Kenyon, 113 Eng. Rep. 482 (1840).
12. Arnold, The Main Purpose Rule and The Statute of Frauds, 10 Cow,=I., L. Q. 28
(1924); Simpson, HoRwcoon ON THE LAw or" Suamysrp 135-53 (1950).
13. The Statute of Frauds has been held to be inapplicable in New York where the oral
promise to pay is in reality a mere incidental part of a larger transaction, such as the oral
promise made by a seller of a note or by the assignor of a chose in action that the note
or claim is good (Milks v. Rich, So N.Y. 269 (1880); State Bank of Pike v. People's
National Bank et al, 118 N.Y. Supp. 641 (1909), note 121 infra), or the oral promise
of a del credere factor guaranteeing that those to whom he sell will pay (Wolff & Hen-
dricks v. Koppel, 5 Hill 458 (N.Y. 1843); Sherwood v. Stone, 14 N.Y. 458 (1843)).
Williston treats these two types of promises as involving the same ground for rendering
the Statute inapplicable. 2 Wur=soN, Co.mAcrs § 484 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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does not appear to have given the main purpose rule or any analogous
rule the general acceptance accorded to such rules by the courts of other
states and it is the apparent attempt of our highest court to devise a
substitute and more limited rule for application to the particular case
of the subsequent oral promise to perform another's pre-existing duty,
which has given rise to uncertainty in the law and to the discussion which
follows.
We will assume for the purpose of giving concrete expression to that
discussion the following typical set of facts, particularly since such
facts present a situation which is not uncommon today. S, an owner
of unimproved land, employs P, a building contractor, to build a house
for S on the latter's land. C, who may be either a subcontractor of P
or his material supplier, to whom P is already indebted in the sum of
$1,000 for work performed or materials supplied in building the house,
refuses to continue work for P or to supply him with materials, unless
S, the owner, agrees to pay both the $1,000 already due and also for
all subsequent work or materials furnished. S, in order to obtain com-
pletion of the house, orally gives the requested promise. Thereafter C
as subcontractor completes the work, or as materialman furnishes the
materials, and P refuses to pay for the work furnished or materials
supplied. In an action by C against S is the Statute of Frauds a de-
fense? In jurisdictions which recognize the main purpose rule or re-
lated rules, there would appear to be a basis for holding S's oral prom-
ise to be enforceable.' 4
One of the most frequently quoted statements of the main purpose
rule is that of Chief Justice Shaw in Nelson v. Boynton:
"The terms original and collateral promise, though not used in the statute, are
convenient enough, to distinguish between the cases, where the direct and leading
object of the promise is to become the surety or guarantor of another's debt, and
those where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of another,
yet the leading object of the undertaker is to subserve or promote some interest
or purpose of his own. The former whether made before, or after, or at the
same time with the promise of the principal is not valid, unless manifested by
evidence in writing; the latter, if made on good consideration, is unaffected by
the statute, because although the effect of it is to release or suspend the debt
of another, yet there is not the leading object on the part of the promisor."'Ir
Another statement of the rule often quoted or referred to is that of
Mr. Justice Clifford in Emerson v. Slater:
14. See Kampman v. Pittsburg Contracting & Engineering Co., 316 Pa. 502, 179 Atl.
396 (1934); 2 WrLIsTo1, CoNmcrs § 481 (Rev. ed. 1936). The Restatement is in accord
with the majority view. RESTATEmENT, SEcuI tn § 92. But see, SmusoN, HommooX oN
Hnm LAW OF SuprvsuPn', 144-6 (1950). Many of the decisions are collected in 99 A.L.R.
76 (1935).
15. 3 Metc. 396, 402 (Mass. 1841).
[Vol, 22
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"But whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose of his own, in-
volving either a benefit to himself, or damage to the other contracting party, his
promise is not within the statute, although it may be in form a promise to pay
the debt of another, and although the performance of it may incidentally have
the effect of extinguishing that liability."' 6
While at one time New York apparently flirted with the idea of
adopting the main purpose rule,' our Court of Appeals cannot be said
to have adopted that rule in the form in which it is generally recog-
nized.'" Instead, so far as applicable to subsequent oral promises to
perform another's antecedent duty, the Court of Appeals has announced
its own rule. The expression of this rule has changed but in its most
definite and articulate form it appears to be the rule finally evolved
in White v. Rintoid, as follows:
". .. where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently contracted, the
promise to pay it is original when it is founded on a new consideration moving
to the promisor and beneficial to him, and such that the promisor thereby comes
under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal
debtor."' 9
It will be the objective of this article to analyze and consider this
rule, particularly in so far as it has been applied in subsequent decisions
of the Court of Appeals, 2° and to attempt to reach some understanding
of its true meaning.
16. 22 How. 28, 43 (U.S. 1859). Also see the leading case of Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S.
479 (1891). In the opinion in a leading English case, Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v.
Martin, [1902] 1 K.B. 778, the court assimilates instances such as that of the del credere
factor with other instances where the oral promise is merely an incidental feature of a
larger object.
17. Mallory v. Gillett, 21 N.Y. 412 (1860) disccussed infra note 28 and accompanying
text.
18. In the comparatively recent case of Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al., 289 N.Y. 133, 44
N.E.2d 398 (1942), the attorneys for the plaintiff in attempting to hold the oral promisor
liable cited decisions of the federal courts applying the main purpose rule, headed by Davis
v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 (1891), supra note 16, but the Court of Appeals refused to follow
these decisions. Id. at 140, 44 N.E. 2d at 401.
19. 108 N.Y. 222, 227, 15 N.E. 318, 320 (1888).
20. No attempt will be made in this paper to consider the decisions of the Appellate
Division or lower New York courts, decided either before or after White v. Rintoul, except
incidentally, even where such decisions have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals without
opinion. The principal opinions of the Court of Appeals, both before and after While v.
Rintoul, have for the most part limited themselves to a discussion of the court's own
decisions. The opinions of the lower New York- courts consist generally of an attempt
to apply the decisions of the highest court in the state. Accordingly, even if space per-
mitted it, a discussion of decisions other than those of the highest court would not appear
to be profitable.
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EVOLUTION OF THE NEW YORK RULE
Chancellor Kent first attempted in Leonard v. Vredenburg t12 to
state a simple test to apply to determine the enforceability of a sub-
sequent oral promise to pay another's antecedent debt. He said that
the oral promise is not within the Statute
"... when the promise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new and
original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting
parties." 22
The basic error in this assumption was effectively demonstrated by
Chief Justice Comstock in Mallory v. Gillett23 when he adverted to the
simple proposition that in the case of a subsequent promise to answer
for an already existing debt of a third person new consideration is
necessary to support the promise as a valid agreement without regard
to the question of the Statute of Frauds and that, therefore, such new
consideration must be shown before any question of the enforceability
of the promise under the Statute is reached. "It is nothing to say that
here was a new consideration. If such were not the fact, there would
be no question in the case.' 2 4
Nevertheless, apparently in deference to the great jurist who had
suggested the new and original consideration test, Judge Comstock,
while remarking that Chancellor Kent's test was "open to some mis-
apprehension," interpreted the suggested test as referring to a new
and beneficial consideration moving to the promisor. In an exhaustive
opinion, which reviewed the authorities and commented favorably upon
the language of Chief Justice -Shaw in Nelson v. Boynton,2 Judge Corn-
stock remarked regarding the decisions permitting enforceability:
"With great variety in the circumstances one controlling characteristic pervades
them all. In every instance, the consideration of the promise was beneficial to
the person promising. This was the feature which imparted to the promise the
character of originality, as that term is used with reference to the Statute of
Frauds."27
In Mallory v. Gillett, C had repaired P's boat to the extent of $125
and had possession of it under a lien. S orally promised to pay the
repair bill if C would deliver the boat to P free of the lien. Five mem-
bers of the court held that the release of the lien did not benefit S, the
21. 8 Johns 29 (N.Y. 1811).
22. Id. at 39.
23. 21 N.Y. 412 (1860).
24. Id. at 414.
25. Id. at 418.
26. 3 Metc. 396 (Mass. 1841); see text accompanying note 15 supra.
27. 21 N.Y. 412, 423 (1860).
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promisor, and accordingly held S's oral promise to be unenforceable
within the Statute. Three judges who dissented were of the opinion that
the relinquishment of the lien was sufficient to take the case out of
the Statute.
The test governing the enforceability of subsequent oral promises
approved in Mallory v. Gillett is, therefore, that of beneficial considera-
tion moving to the promisor. While actually such a test may be different,
not only in wording but somewhat in content, from the main purpose
rule as announced in Nelson v. Boynton and other cases, it has been
accepted by respected authority as being substantially the same rule.2
Eight years after Mallory v. Gillett the case of Brown v. Weber"
was decided by the Court of Appeals. The facts were substantially the
hypothetical facts assumed above as a typical case. S, an owner, orally
promised to pay P's subcontractor, C, the amount due from P in order
to induce C to complete the work for S. Here indeed appeared to be
a case of beneficial consideration moving from C to S. However, the
court held that C had failed to perform his contract and hence the
court was not required to reach the question of Statute of Frauds.
Nevertheless, since the case had been decided below upon the basis
of the Statute of Frauds, the court considered an examination of the
law on that question to be proper.
The court said of the Statute:
"The language shows that the test to be applied to every case is, whether the
party sought to be charged is the principal debtor, primarily liable, or whether he
is only liable in case of the default of a third person; in other words, whether
he is the debtor, or whether his relation to the creditor is that of surety to him
for the performance, by some other person, of the obligation of the latter to the
creditor. In the former case the promise is not within the statute, because the
party promising is not undertaking for the performance by another, of some duty
owing by the other, but for the performance of his own obligation; but, in the
latter case, it is within the statute, because the liability is contingent upon, whether
another performs his obligation, for whose performance the party sought to be
charged has undertaken. There has never been any dispute as to the above
principles, but the difficulty has been in determining to which class the cases that
have been adjudged belonged. The principal cases were very elaborately reviewed
28. Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, 20 Cor. L. REv. 153 (1920), in
which the author thus describes the doctrine of Mallory v. Gillett at page 182: "It looks
to the purpose of the promise rather than its form. It holds that the statute was aimed
at promises directly for the benefit of the debtor, and that the proof of direct benefits
to the promisor in exchange for the promise, or proof of benefit antecedently received from
the debtor which induced the promise, is sufficient corroboration to put the promise out-
side the danger of fraudulent proof of parol promises aimed at by the statute. This doc-
trine is that which has been arrived at in England and is that which is most generally
accepted in the United States."
29. 38 N.Y. 187 (1868).
1953]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
and classified in Mallory v. Gillett (21 N.Y. 412). From these cases it appears
that the courts have endeavored to establish certain rules by the application of
which the case in judgment could be determined; but this has been attended with
much embarrassment arising from the almost infinite variety of cases that have
arisen; one test was the inquiry, whether the promise was original or collateral.
This would be perfect if the term 'original' is understood in all cases as applicable
only to an absolute undertaking by the party promising to discharge an obligation
of his own, not at all dependent upon performance or non-performance of any
thing by another. The party is then himself the debtor, and must discharge the
obligation, and it matters not whether some other is liable for the same thing or
not. The party promising is not discharged, although another may pay or perform,
unless the other does it as his surety or by his procurement. Brut this test is liable
to mislead, as is shown in the case of Mallory v. Gillett, supra, if the term 'original'
is understood in the sense of new.
"Another test relied upon in many cases is, whether the consideration was new,
not arising out of the existing obligation, and received by the party making the
promise. Where this was the case, it was held, that the case was not within the
statute, and these facts are cited as the reasons why it is not. In most cases these
facts will show whether the party promising contracted an independent obligation
of his own, or whether his position to the creditor was that of a surety. The former
case is not within the statute; the latter is. As an illustration, suppose A delivers
property to B, in consideration of his promise to become surety to him for the
payment of a debt owing to him by C: the case is within the statute, because B's
obligation, although upon a consideration received by him, is that of surety only
that C shall perform. Again, suppose that B, in consideration that A will discharge
C of a debt owing to A, promises A that he will thereafter pay the whole or any
part of such debt, the case is not within the statute, for the reason that B has
contracted an independent debt of his own, and is in no sense surety to A for
the performance of any thing by C, although he personally received no consideration
for his promise. It will thus be seen that the receipt or non-receipt of the con-
sideration by the party promising, does not determine in every case whether it is
within the statute or not, but that the inquiry still remains whether he entered
into an independent obligation of his own, or whether his responsibility was con.
tingent upon the act of another."8 0
The above language has been quoted at length because it is note-
worthy for two reasons: (1) the opinion very clearly repudiates the
test suggested in Mallory v. Gillett; beneficial consideration moving to
the promisor is not alone sufficient to take the oral promise out of the pro-
tection of the Statute; (2) the court suggests for the first time that an
additional element is required, i.e., that the promisor (S) must also be-
come independently liable to the promisee (C) before the promise falls
without the purview of the Statute.
The court observed that, despite P's contract with the plaintiff, C,
to complete the work, it was nevertheless competent for the defendant,
S, "to make an independent contract with the plaintiff for doing the
30. Id. at 189-91.
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same job, and to pay him therefor, and such contract would not come
within the Statute; . 31
In other words the court appears to have said that whenever P re-
mains liable to C and S later becomes obligated to C for the same
debt, the liability of S must be that of a surety to whom the statutory
provision by its literal terms applies; but that if upon a good considera-
tion S later becomes liable to C in such a manner that C will be en-
titled to performance separately from both P and S (i.e., double per-
formance) the Statute of Frauds does not apply. In such latter case
it just happens that the performance promised by S is the same as the
performance owed by P but the former.is in no way dependent upon or
related to the latter..
The rule suggested in Brown v. Weber appears to be that found in
the very language of the Statute: the oral promise of a surety, i.e., one
who becomes obligated in any form to perform another's duty, must
be in writing to be enforceable. If the matter ended there, there would
be no further doubt about the meaning of the New York Statute.
Six years later the court decided Sanders v. Gillespie2 There the
plaintiff, apparently at the defendant's request, had become first in-
dorser, with the defendant second indorser, of a note representing an
indebtedness upon which the plaintiff already was liable. Defendant
orally promised that if the plaintiff would pay the note at maturity,
the defendant would reimburse the plaintiff by the delivery of mer-
chandise. Plaintiff paid the note and defendant defaulted. The court
citing Brown v. Weber, held that the defendant's liability was independ-
ent of that of the maker of the note. The court also cited Leonard v.
Vredenburgh in connection with its statement that there was "a new and
original consideration of benefit or harm moving between newly con-
tracting parties,'"3 but the real and ultimate ground of decision, in
connection with which the court cited Mallory v. Gillett, appears to
have been that "it was an agreement to indemnify one who was a
guarantor for a third person to some one else."34 Considered as involv-
ing a promise by an indemnitor given in order to induce a person to
assume another's debt, the result reached in Sanders v. Gillespie appears
to be unexceptional, for the New York courts have consistently held
the Statute of Frauds to be inapplicable to such a promise 5
31. Id. at 191.
32. 59 N.Y. 250 (1874).
33. Id. at 252.
34. Ibid.
35. See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
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Ackley v. Parmenter6 would not warrant discussion here were it
not for the fact that it is later cited by the Court of Appeals as bear-
ing upon the problem. The case may be simply classified with the so-
called "property cases" in which P delivers property to S and the
latter orally promises C to apply the property to pay P's debt. In such
a case most jurisdictions hold that S's promise is enforceable to the
extent of the value of the property received by S since the duty to pay
P's debt is imposed by law upon S as a trustee and exists apart from
his promise to C."7 New York, by virtue of a seemingly technical
distinction based upon the precise time when the promise is made, ap-
pears to hold that if S's promise is to pay C out of the proceeds of the
property, the duty to make such payment does .not arise until such
proceeds have been realized and that if S's promise to pay C is made
before that time, it is within the Statute of Frauds.O8 The court held
the oral promise made in Ackley v. Parmenter to be of the latter kind
and, accordingly, found for the defendant.
White v. Rintou 9 has without doubt become an outstanding case
36. 98 N.Y. 425 (1885).
37. 2 W VLISTOX, CONTRACTS § 459 (Rev. ed. 1936). REsTAT-MENT, SacuanTY § 91. To
the extent that the property is insufficient to pay P's debt the Statute is a defense (Belknap
v. Bender, 75 N.Y. 446, 452 (1878)) and where S has promised to pay P's debt and the
property has been received by him from P merely as security to indemnify him, the Statute
should also be a defense. See Becker et al. v. Krank et al., 75 App. Div. 191, 194, 77 N. Y.
Supp. 665, 667 (3d Dep't 1902). The above instances must be distinguished from the case
where the promisor has purchased property from a debtor and as part of the considera-
tion has assumed payment of the seller's debt. In First National Bank v. Chalmers, 144
N.Y. 432, 434, 39 N.E. 311 (1895), the court said: "What constitutes an original prom-
ise, upon which the Statute of Frauds does not operate, and which, therefore, may be
valid and effectual without a writing, is fairly settled in one direction at least. Wherever
the facts show that the debtor had transferred or delivered to the promisor, for his own
use and benefit, money or property in consideration of the latter's agreement to assume
and pay the outstanding debt, and he, thereupon, has promised the creditor to pay, that
promise is original, upon the ground that by the acceptance of the fund or property under
an agreement to assume and pay the debt the promisor had made that debt his own, has
become primarily liable for its discharge, and has assumed an independent duty of pay-
ment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor. (Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N.Y.
425; White v. Rintoul, 108 id. 223.) In such a case the debt has become that of the new
party promising; his promise is not to pay the debt of another, but his own; as between
him and the primary debtor the latter has become practically a surety entitled to require
the payment to be made by his transferee."
38. Belknap v. Bender, 75 N.Y. 446 (1878). The decision is sound in so far as it holds
that C may not enforce S's promise until the property has been liquidated, since, until
that time no duty exists. Where, however, the property is later liquidated, the duty to
apply the proceeds comes into existence and should be enforceable by the creditor regard-
less of the promise.
39. 108 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 318 (1888).
[Vol, 22
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on the subject under discussion. In that case the unanimous Court of
Appeals, speaking through Judge Finch, laid down what was clearly
intended to be a forthright and definitive statement of the court's
position on the problem. Simply stated the facts were that the firm of
P was indebted to C who was pressing for payment. S, the father of one
of the members of the firm of P and who held a chattel mortgage on
fixtures and machinery of the firm to secure an indebtedness of the
firm to him, orally promised C that if C forbore, he (S) would pay
the firm's debt to C. The court might readily have disposed of the
case in the defendant's favor by finding, as it did, that since S was
adequately secured, C's promise of forbearance in no wise benefited
S. Nevertheless the court, undoubtedly conscious of the uncertainty
existing as a result of its own former opinions, reviewed the court's
prior pronouncements.
The court referred to Leonard v. Vredenburgh, Mallory v. Gilelt,
Brown v. Weber and Ackley v. Parmenter as representing three stages
in the development of the doctrine prevailing in New York which
distinguishes between promises within and without the Statute of
Frauds. The court said:
"Each was a definite and deliberate advance toward a more faithful observance
of the statute, and an abandonment of efforts to narrow the just and natural
range of its application." 40
The court then discussed each case separately. The "new consideration"
test of Leonard v. Vredenburgl is characterized as "dangerously broad
and capable of grave misapprehension."41 The "beneficial considera-
tion" test of Mallory v. Gillett, which the court practically identifies
with the Nelson v. Boynton main purpose rule, is accepted but the
court points to the language in Brown v. Weber as adding to the general-
ity of that test the limitation that, in addition to beneficial considera-
tion moving to the promisor, the promisor must come under an in-
dependent duty of payment. Ackley v. Parnenter is then referred to
by the court as giving authoritative support to what the court recognizes
was merely a dictum in Brown v. Weber. The court then announces
the rule:
"These four cases, advancing by three distinct stages in a common direction,
have ended in establishing a doctrine in the courts of this state which may be
stated with approximate accuracy thus, that where the primary debt subsists and
was antecedently contracted, the promise to pay it is original when it is founded
on a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, and such
40. Id. at 224, 15 N.E. at 319.
41. Id. at 225, 15 N.E. at 319.
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that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective
of the liability of the principal debtor."42
The above quoted statement represents the rule which after its pro-
nouncement the New York Court of Appeals has consistently relied
upon in determining the enforceability-in most cases the non-enforce-
ability-of oral promises to pay debts antecedently contracted by
persons other than the promisor.
We will now consider the subsequent applications of the rule by the
court to cases in which the problem of the enforceability of such oral
promises has been squarely presented.
DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO White v. Rintoul
The most significant thing about the decisions of the Court of Ap-
peals rendered both before and after White v. Rintoul is that almost
invariably the court has ruled the oral, subsequent promise to be
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.4 The actual adjudications,
therefore, leave us with a negative, rather than a positive norm. The((advances" referred to by Judge Finch were, as he observed, toward
a tightening of the statutory provisions, but even under the more liberal
approaches of Leonard v. Vredenburgh and Mallory v. Gillett, the
plaintiff was always unsuccessful in holding. the promisor liable.
42. Id. at 227, 15 N.E. at 320. (Italics added). Professor Williston seems to be of the
opinion that such a promise is within the protection of the Statute of Frauds if It be
assumed that payment by the new promisor will discharge any existing liability. 2 WIus-
TcoN, CONTRACTS § 456 (Rev. ed. 1936). He says: "If it were held that a promise was on
that account withdrawn from the Statute, many transactions understood by the parties
to be guaranties, and treated by the courts as such, would be withdrawn from the Statute.
Behind any question of the necessity of a writing is the principle of contracts that a prom-
isor if held at all must be held according to the terms of his promise, and it Is certainly
true in a large number of cases where a guaranty is intended that the guarantor defines his
undertaking, not by any reference to the legal liability of the principal, but by reference
to matter in pais. He guarantees 'the prie' of goods furnished the principal, 'the rent' of
a house leased to him, the paymelt of a[ fixed sum of money; and whether the parties
contemplate that there is a great chance, a small chance or no chance that the person
named as principal debtor is under no legal obligation seems immaterial. The sole question
should be whether the person so named in fact is under a legal obligation."
43. In the relatively few cases such as Sanders v. Gillespie, 59 N. Y. 250 (1874) ; Raabe
et al. v. Squier et al., 148 N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895); Lamkin v. Palmer, 164 N.Y.
201, 58 N.E. 123 (1900),-aso see Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co. et al., 287 N.Y.
322, 39 N.E. 257 (1942)-in which the Court of Appeals has permitted enforcement of
the oral promise to pay fhe indebtedness for which another person has continued to be
liable there have been circumstances which may have justified the result, as the text of
this article will attempt to indicate. While not saying that each of these cases may be
sui generis, the fact remains that we do not appear to have any case decided by the Court
of Appeals in which the oral promise of one who is actually a surety (with the exceptions
noted in notes 11,13 supra and 67 infra) has been held to be enforceable.
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By a strict application of the doctrine of stare decisis we are able
to state rather definitely what subsequent oral promises are not en-
forceable. However, the nearest approach to an affirmative rule of
guidance is the above quoted and italicized language from the opinion
in White v. Rintoul. The language in subsequent opinions of the court
to some extent consists of discussions, analyses and explanations of
the rule as laid down in White v. Rintoul. It will be the object of this
paper, after considering the decisions of the Court of Appeals handed
down since White v. Rintoul, to explore the possible situations where
the court may enforce an oral promise even though it may in some way
relate to the antecedently contracted debt of another person.
One decision, which has been pointed to44 as having in effect over-
ruled the dictum in Brown v. Weber requiring that the promisor come
"under an independent duty of payment irrespective of liability of the
principal debtor," to have reinstated the beneficial consideration rule
of Mallory v. Gillett or the substantially equivalent main purpose rule
of Nelson v. Boynton and to have rendered these rules and Judge Finch's
statement of the law in White v. Rintoul as synonymous, is Raabe et al.
v. Squier et al.' It is also a case where the Court of Appeals held the
oral promise to be enforceable.
However, the distinguishing and important feature in Raabe et al.
v. Squier et al. is that the promise was not to pay an antecedent debt
but rather a debt created after and in consideration of the promise.
This is the court's own appraisal of the facts.
"As to the Statute of Frauds it appears to us that its provisions have no
application to the case under consideration. In the first place the indebtedness
at the time the promise was made has been paid. The promise, in so far as it
is here sought to be enforced, related to the indebtedness thereafter to be created."40
The facts were substantially identical with our assumed typical state
of facts except that the promise of S (the owner) to pay C, the supplier,
applied solely to future deliveries by C.
44. Burdick, Suretyship and The Statute of Frauds, 20 CoL. L. Rr'. 133, 174-5 (1920).
45. 148 N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895).
46. Id. at 87, 42 N.E. at 518. Where the promise of the owner to pay applies solely
to the services to be performed or materials to be delivered in the future it appears to be
universally acknowledged that the Statute does not apply, since, in such a case the con-
sideration is being furnished directly to the promisor who is the principal debtor. Parisi
v. Hubbard, 226 App. Div. 280, 235 N.Y. Supp. 220 (4th Dep't 1929); Shisler v. Moore,
19 F. 2d 991 (3d Cir. 1927). In fact some courts declare as severable a promise to pay for
both materials to be delivered in the future as well as for materials already delivered and
uphold the Statute as a defense only in respect to the goods already delivered. Peterson
v. Paxton-Pavey Lumber Co., 102 Fla. 89, 135 So. 501 (1931); Board of Commissioners
v. Cincinnati Steam Heating Co., 128 Ind. 240, 27 N.E. 612 (1891).
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The court found that beneficial consideration in the form of the
future deliveries moved to S and then, in what might easily mislead
one, stated that this brought the case within the rule stated by Judge
Finch in White v. Rintozd, i.e., "where the primary debt subsists and
was antecedently contracted, the promise to pay it is original when it
is founded on a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial
to him, and such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent
duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor."
Here the only "primary debt" which "was antecedently contracted" and
which continued to subsist at the time the promise of S was made was
P's obligation under his contract with C to purchase and pay for all
materials called for by the supply contract. C was calling upon S not to
perform that contractual obligation but rather to pay the purchase
price of the materials delivered after and on the strength of S's promise.
While the payment by S for such materials would to that extent dis-
charge P's contractual obligation to C, the payment would be made
"irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor," even assuming
that P, in respect to the materials delivered after S's promise, continued
to be the principal debtor.
But in respect to the future materials involved it would appear that
P was in no real sense the principal debtor. The defendant's promise
in Raabe et al. v. Squier et al. was that, if P did not pay, S "would
take it out of the amount going to them [P] and would pay the plain-
tiffs."" In such a case, as Professor Williston points out,48 even where
P still remains liable on his contract to C, S is in reality the principal
debtor. He is not promising as a surety because, upon payment to
C, S would have no right of reimbursement against P. As between
P and S, the debt is principally S's. The consideration, that is, the
future deliveries of materials, was furnished directly for the benefit
of S, who, if he had not paid P therefor, remained principally and
ultimately liable.49
The later decision in Lamkin v. Palmer" is more difficult to reconcile
with the court's abandonment of Mallory v. Gillett and its apparent
tendency not to enforce oral promises to pay another's debt. There
47. 148 N.Y. 81, 86, 42 N.E. 516, 518 (1895).
48. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 1379, § 481 (Rev. ed. 1936); see Block v. Galitzka, 114
App. Div. 799, 100 N.Y. Supp. 173 (2d Dep't 1906).
49. There does not appear to be any indication in the facts of the case, as stated by
the court, that the moneys due to P (the building contractor) on the contract were in-
sufficient to pay C for the materials. S may have had the right to retain sufficient moneys
due to P to satisfy his suppliers of material.
S0. 164 N.Y. 201, 58 N.E. 123 (1900).
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C, the plaintiff, an employee and stockholder of the P corporation, in
order to enable it to -carry on its business, had loaned money to the
corporation, part of whose debts the defendant S had become obligated
to pay. S had obtained an offer for the purchase of part of the P
corporation's assets and in order to induce C as a stockholder of P
to consent to the sale, S orally promised C to pay his claim out of
the proceeds of the sale. The court held the promise to be enforceable,
saying:
"If there was a new and distinct consideration moving to the defendant and
beneficial to him, the promise to pay was not within the statute." (Citing Leonard
v. Vredenburglh and Raabe et al. v. Squier et al.)
It is not quite understandable how the court, after Judge Finch's
careful exposition of its prior positions ("advances") in White v. Rin-
tod, could have relied upon the "new and distinct consideration" doc-
trine of Chancellor Kent in Leonard v. Vredenburgh as a justification
for its holding. The reference to mere beneficial consideration as
the norm might certainly lead one to believe that the court bad back-
tracked and was repudiating the "independent duty of payment" ele-
ment, the latest advance clearly specified in White v. Rintozd.'
Nevertheless, the facts in Lakhnin v. Palmer, although not so clearly
as those in Raabe et al. v. Squier et al., appear to be distinguishable
from the usual case of an oral promise to pay another's antecedent
debt. The promise was to pay C from the proceeds of the sale of part
of P corporation's assets. If we look to the substance of the trans-
action, and disregard the distinction made in Belknap v. Bender'2 in
reference to the time when the promise was made, we have what is
tantamount to the not uncommon case of S, to whom P has turned
over property, promising to pay P's debts from the proceeds of the
sale of such property. The fact was that the contemplated purchaser
refused to complete the purchase unless C's claim was settled or his
consent to the sale was obtained. Nearly all courts in such a case
would enforce S's promise, at least to the extent of the proceeds of
the sale, since in such a case S is in reality merely promising to perform
a duty which he has already assumedY3 Moreover, S was already
obligated to pay some of the P corporation's debts and by paying C
would to that extent be reducing the obligations of P corporation and
thus freeing its remaining assets for payment of its debts.
51. This appears to be Professor Burdick's belief: Burdick, Suretyship and the Statute
of Frauds, 20 CoL. L. REv. 153, 182 (1920).
52. 75 N.Y. 446 (1878); see note 38 supra.
53. See note 37 supra and Mann v. Ewing, 156 Misc. 216, 281 N.Y. Supp. 515 (Sup.
Ct. 1935).
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Without expatiating further upon Lamkin v. Palmer, it should suffice
to say that, in view of the unusual facts in the case, particularly the
fact that S was not promising to pay P's debt from his own substance,
the actual decision of the court, disregarding the court's very brief
discussion of the legal principles involved, cannot be considered to
have the effect of being a clear departure from the definite position
taken by the court in White v. Rintoul.
Richardson Press v. Albright 4 marks the beginning of the court's
more recent attempt to explain and apply the rule announced in White
v. Rintoul. At the outset it should be observed that, just as in White
v. Rintoul, the coUrt could apparently have disposed of the case against
the plaintiff upon the narrow ground that there was lacking the first
and essential element of the rule announced in White v. Rintoul, namely,
beneficial consideration moving to the promisor, S. The court observed
that S's beneficial interest in making the promise "was at best re-
mote." However, as observed by the court in a later case,50 the
decision was not put upon that ground but upon the broader one that
the promisor, S, did not come under an independent duty of payment,
irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.
In Richardson Press v. Albright, S, a large stockholder of P, a pub-
lisher, orally promised to pay C, a printer, for about half of the past
due account owed by P to C for printing the magazine published by
P and at the same time agreed to pay in cash for the printing of each
subsequent issue of the magazine. The Court of Appeals made an
obvious effort to elucidate the meaning of the "independent duty of
payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor" element
suggested in White v. Rintoul. After pointing out that C, after S's
promise, continued to look to and pursued P and.not S for payment and
only turned to S when P's resources were completely exhausted, the
court stated that S's promise "is regarded as original only when the
party sought to be charged clearly becomes within the intention of
the parties a principal debtor primarily liable.""1
Aside from the quoted language, the disposition of the case by
the Court of Appeals would not appear to be particularly noteworthy.
Even assuming that the additional printing benefited S, P's large
stockholder, the circumstances indicated that S's promise was intended
and accepted by C, to be purely collateral to P's liability; in other
words, that S promised as a surety or guarantor. Credit for the new
54. 224 N.Y. 497, 121 N.E. 362 (1918).
55. Id at 501, 121 N.E. at 363.
56. Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al., 289 N.Y. 133, 137-8, 44 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1942).
57. 224 N.Y. 497, 502, 121 N.E. 362, 364 (1918).
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printing was extended by C, the court found, "primarily" to P and this
fact was emphasized by C's subsequent efforts to collect from P before
C made any claim against S. However, the use by the court of two
concepts: (1) intention of the parties, and (2) primary liability, as
an apparent explanation of what is meant by the "independent duty,
irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor" language of White
v. Rintoul would seem to be worthy of analysis, even though involving
a digression, to ascertain whether possibly the court was offering some
new explanation of its former language. First, what significance may
be attached to the adverb "primarily"?
A surety is one who becomes liable in any form to discharge another's
duty58 That other person who, as between himself and the surety, has
the ultimate duty of performance is generally called the principal.
His liability is "original" in the sense in which that word was used
in the old action of debt59 His, as a matter of agreement, justice
or right, is the ultimate duty of performance. It is a mere matter of
nomenclature whether we designate his liability as "primary" or "prin-
cipal" and that of the surety as "secondary" or "collateral," so long as
it is understood that either word "primary" or "principal" is intended
to designate the obligation of that one of two obligors who, as between
him and the other obligor, owes the duty of performance. It is in that
sense that Professor Williston sometimes refers to the principal's liability
as "primary." ° Similarly the words "secondary" and "collateral" are
often used interchangeably to refer to the obligation of a surety, name-
ly, one who is entitled to indemnity or reimbursement from another (the
primary or principal obligor) if he is compelled to perform that other's
duty.
However, in another, and semantically perhaps a more correct sense,
the obligation of obligors may be designated as being either "primary"
or "secondary" to indicate the conditional form of the obligation with
58. 4 W=Tzszox, CoNmACTS § 1211 (Rev. ed. 1936). The word "surety" is used here
in its broader sense as including a guarantor. The distinction made in some American cases
between a surety, as one who makes a direct and unconditional promise to the creditor,
and a guarantor who makes a conditional promise, AsuoLD, OumnrEs OF Sunz=smw Am
GuApaukw r § 7 (1927), merely emphasizes the form of the undertaking which cannot affect
the basic relationship between P and S. SInx SO, HoIaBoox 0o.- = Law or Sunm'smr
§ 7 (1950). The distinction has rightfully been criticized as of little or no value (Radin,
Guaranty and Suretyship, 17 CAzL. L. Rzv. 605 (1929)) and many courts have ignored
it. Davis v. Wells, 104 U.S. 159 (1881); Read et al. v. Cutts, 7 Me. 186 (1831); People
v. Backus et al., 117 N.Y. 196, 22 N.E. 759 (1889).
59. Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assurnpsit, 8 HEnv. L. Ray. 252, 263-4 (1894). Also
see Hening, A New and Old Reading of the Statute of Frauds, 57 U. or PA. L. REv. 611
(1909).
60: 2 Wn sroN, CoNTRAczs §§ 448-84, seriatum (Rev. ed. 1936).
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its consequent effect upon the procedural rights of the obligee.0 1 In
this sense the obligation of a surety-giving that word its more re-
stricted meaning---was said to be primary, his obligation being abso-
lute, while by way of contrast that of a guarantor was said to be
secondary, his obligation being conditional." In this sense also the
obligation of a maker of a note is primary while that of an indorser
is secondary.64 And yet while in form a person's obligation may be
primary, in substance it may be secondary, or vice-versa. For example,
an accommodation maker is in the formal sense primarily liable on the
instrument and yet in reality he is a surety and thus in another and
more substantive sense his liability is secondary. Or a person who
formally guarantees the debt of another and thus appears to be second-
arily liable may in fact be the real debtor since the person whose debt
he guarantees may be merely his agent 5 and thus in fact a surety en-
titled to reimbursement from his so-called "guarantor" if compelled to
pay the debt.
In Richardson Press v. Albright the form of the oral promise testified
to could not have been controlling because the plaintiff's testimony was
that the promise was absolute in form6" and yet the court held the
promise to be unenforceable. The fact, therefore, that C, the plaintiff,
first pursued P rather than the promisor S appears to have been sig-
nificant in showing, not that C considered P to be primarily liable
procedurally, but in demonstrating that credit had been extended prin-
cipally to P and that P was accordingly the principal and, in that
sense, the primary obligor "within the intention of the parties."
In a Statute of Frauds case the form which the oral promise is alleged
61. The liability of a surety is primary in the sense that immediately upon the princi-
pal's default, the surety may be proceeded against without any effort by the creditor (C)
to pursue the principal (P). General Phoenix Corp. v. Cabot, 300 N.Y. 87, 89 N.E. 2d
238 (1949); First National Bank v. Jones et a., 219 N.Y. 312, 114 N.E. 349 (1916). Of
course, the liability of the surety (guarantor) may by the terms of the agreement be made
secondary as in the case of a so-called guarantor of collectibility. RESTATLMNT, SECURITY
§ 130; Northern Insurance Co. v. Wright, 76 N.Y. 445 (1879); Dillman v. Nadelhoffer,
160 Ill. 121, 43 N.E. 378 (1895). Cf. Loos v. McCormack, 107 App. Div. 8, 95 N.Y. Supp.
1141 (1st Dep't 1905). See ARNOLD, OUTINES OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 7, pp. 9-13
(1927).
62. See note 58 supra.
63. See note 61 supra.
64. N.Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 3.
65. Lesser-Goldman Cotton Co. v. Merchants' & Plaster's Bank, 182 Ark. 130, 30
S.W. 2d 215 (1930). Cf. Bartolotta v. Calvo, 112 Conn. 385, 152 AtI. 306 (1930).
66. The promise testified to and accepted by the trier of the facts was: "I will agree
to pay you $1,500 in three payments, $500 weekly. I will further agree to pay each Issue
hereafter in cash, before you send it out." 224 N.Y. 497, 500, 121 N.E. 362, 363 (1918).
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to have taken can usually be of only minor value in solving the
problem. One commentator has expressed the opinion that the rule
set forth in White v. Rintoid means that to be without the protection
of the Statute, S's promise "must be such that it can clearly be in-
terpreted as 'I will pay you' and does not amount to 'I will pay you
if he does not.' "6 Would that it were that simple and easy. If the
substance of what was agreed upon can be "intepreted" to mean that
S will pay if P does not, then unquestionably in most situations S's
promise would be held to be collateral, since it would indicate that both
C and S considered P's liability to be "primary" in the sense of "prin-
cipal."69 But, as pointed out above, even one actually a principal debtor
may sometimes promise to pay what is in fact his own debt only upon
condition that his surety does not pay it. Therefore, an oral promise
absolute in form such as "I will pay you" cannot merely by reason
of its unconditional form be held to be original, as the very holding
in Richardson Press v. Albright shows. The relationship between P
and S, known to C, may still be availed of to show that, although S
has orally promised in the most absolute form---"honor bound," "my
word is as good as my bond"-to pay the debt, the debt is in reality
P's and not S's and that, therefore, S's promise is unenforceable since
it is collateral.
There are also substantial reasons why the form of the oral prom-
ise cannot be determinative in resolving questions involving the Stat-
ute of Frauds. The policy of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent
recoveries based upon perjured testimony of witnesses. This policy
could be easily evaded if the form of the promise controlled because
a false witness could readily be coached to testify to the unconditional
form of S's alleged oral promise. But in addition it would appear that the
form of S's promise really becomes important only when that promise
has become formal to the extent of having been reduced to a writing.
67. "The real character of a promise does not depend altogether upon the form of ex-
pression, but largely upon the situation of the parties: and the question always is, what
the parties mutually understood by the language, whether they understood it to be a col-
lateral or direct promise." Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 489 (1891). See Carvifle v.
Crane, 5 Hill 483, 485 (N.Y. 1843), 2 Wmr.asro, Co-rcis § 465 (Rev. ed. 1936). In
one case it may be said that the form of the promise is determinative. It is well settled
that where the form of the undertaking is joint, rather than joint and several, the prom-
ises are without the protection of the Statute even though in reality as between the two
promisors the relationship of principal and surety exists, this because the joint promise is
considered to create a single debt. Gibbs et al. v. Blanchard, 15 Mich. 292 (1867); Boyce
v. Murphy, 91 Ind. 1 (1883).
68. 4 ComRN L. Q. 60, 61 (1918).
69. Sim'soN, HoRBooat oN THE LAW oF SuaRivsmP, 124-5 (1950).
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At that point questions, such as questions of procedure other than
those involving the Statute of Frauds, may arise.
It would seem, therefore, that the court in Richardson Press v. Al-
bright was not concerned with the mere form of S's oral promise and
that when it used the expression "a principal debtor primarily liable"
the adjective and the adverb were being used with synonymous mean-
ing.70
What significance has the expression "within the intention of the
parties"? We must first consider to which of the parties the court
was referring. In every case under the provision of the Statute of
Frauds with which we are concerned there are three parties: C, S and
P. It is unlikely that the court meant all three parties since actually the
publishing company, P, except to the extent it was represented by S,
was not a party to the conversations which gave rise to the alleged
promise. The same is true in many other Statute of Frauds cases.
The parties, therefore, to whose intention the court referred were either
P and S or C and S. They could not be P and C because their intention
could hardly determine the nature of S's liability. The same is true
of P and S. The literal language of the Statute of Frauds makes un-
enforceable the oral promise of a surety. Whether a promisor is a
surety depends essentially upon the dealing between P and 'S.1 If,
as between P and S the debt ought to be paid by P, S is a surety.
Dealings between P and S may shift from P to S the ultimate respon-
sibility for the debt in which event S would become the principal debtor
and P the surety. 2 But the mere intention of P and S cannot accom-
plish this result. Rather it is the consideration passing between them
that brings about the change. The court must have been referring to
the intention of C and S.
The Statute of Frauds only becomes involvedin a contest between C
and S, not in one between P and S. As Williston7" and the Restatement
74
70. It is significant that the Court of Appeals in Brown v. Weber, 38 N.Y. 187, 189
(1868), used similar language in describing a principal obligor: "The language [of the
Statute] shows that the test to be applied to every case is whether the party sought to be
charged is the principal debtor, primarily liable, or whether he is only liable in case of the
default of a third person; in other words, whether he is the debtor, or whether his rela-
tion to the creditor is that of surety to him for the performance, by some other person,
of the obligation of the latter to the creditor." (Italics added).
71. 2 WxnasToN, CoNTRAcTs § 475 (Rev. ed. 1936).
72. First National Bank v. Chalmers et al., 144 N.Y. 432, 434, 39 N.E. 331 (1895)
quoted in note 37 supra.
73. 2 WmusroN, CONTRACTS, § 475 (Rev. ed. 1936). Williston points out also, how-
ever, that belief by C that S is promising as a surety does not render the Statute of Frauds
available to S as a defense, if actually S is not a surety. See note 65 supra and accom-
panying text for an illustration. Another illustration would be the case where the supposed
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point out, even where S is in fact a surety, the applicability of the
Statute may depend upon the knowledge which C has of that fact.'-
Moreover, so far as the Statute is concerned, S may become the principal
debtor as to C even without knowledge or consent of P, as where C
releases P upon S's assumption of P's indebtedness to C. In such
a case, absent P's consent to the substitution of obligors, there is lacking
a technical legal novation,76 but, nevertheless, S's promise will be en-
forceable under the Statute as that of one who has become an original
obligor. 7
From all of the above, and the context in which the language was
used, it seems clear that the parties, to whose intentions the court re-
ferred in Richardson Press v. Albright, were C and S.
What part does the intention of C and S play in the solution of
the problem? The suretyship relation is a contractual one and it is
axiomatic that a contractual intent is necessary to the existence of a
contract. The important question remains, however, as to what kind
of contractual relationship C and S intended. The court in Richardson
Press v. Albright states that S's promise "is regarded as original only
when" S "clearly becomes within the intention of" presumably C and
S "a principal debtor." Can the mere intention of C and S, contractual
or otherwise, make the new promisor, S, a principal debtor?
Certainly the mere intention of C and S cannot alter the basic rela-
tionship between S and P. 8 As we have already seen, whether P or S
obligation of P to C is void as in the case where P is an insane person or a married woman
at common law. SmrPsoN, HoaRNoon oy TnE LAw or Su, ,smmr, 126-7 (1950).
74. RESTATEmx--T, SEcuRT § 90.
75. Knowledge by C of the true relation between P and S is important in other fields
of the law of suretyship, e.g., an alteration without S's consent of the obligation owed by
P to C will be a defense to S only if C knew of the surety relationship between P and S,
as in the case where S retires from the partnership of P and S and P, as partial considera-
tion for the purchase of S's interest in the firm, assumes the obligation to pay the firm
creditors, and thereafter C, a firm creditor, without S's consent, extends the maturity of the
firm debt. The retired partner S is a surety but he will not be discharged of the debt to S
unless C knew of the agreement and dissolution. N.Y. PAr.rmsm LAw, § 67(2). Strike-
man v. Whitman, Requardt and Smith, 272 App. Div. 627, 7S N.Y. S.2d 73 (3d Dep't
1947); Advance Rubber Co. v. Bershad, 125 Misc. 826, 211 N.Y. Supp. 574 (App. Term,
2d Dep't 1925).
76. 2 Wi sox, CONmTAcTS, § 477 (Rev. ed. 1936).
77. Meriden Brittania Co. v. Zingsen, 48 N.Y. 247 (1872); Booth v. Eighmie, 60 N.Y.
238 (1875); Claggett v. Donaldson, 238 App. Div. 831, 263 N.Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 262 N.Y. 697, 188 N.E. 113 (1933) ; Blek v. Wilson et ai., 241 App. Div.
98, 271 N.Y. Supp. 553 (Ist Dep't 1934); Slotnick v. Smith et al., 252 Mass. 303, 147
N.E. 737 (1925).
78. Consideration must pass to convert the principal obligor into a surety and vice-
versa. See note 72 supra.
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is the principal debtor depends upon which one of them, as between
themselves without regard to C, should pay the debt. However, we have
also seen that the applicability of the Statute of Frauds does not always
depend upon the relationship between P and S.11 It would appear, as
pointed out above, that where S is actually a surety, he may be deprived
of the defense of the Statute if C is ignorant of that fact, even though
C's belief that S is a surety will not make the Statute available to him
as a defense where actually S is not a surety. 0 Therefore, while, for
purposes other than the Statute of Frauds, the relationship between P
and S determines whether one or the other is a surety, it would seem
that the court in Richardson Press v. Albright may have been stating
that for the purpose of the Statute of Frauds the agreement between C
and S may at times be determinative of whether, as between C and S, S
becomes a principal debtor, even though actually, as between P and S,
S is a surety.8'
We must recognize that once again the court in referring to the in-
tention of the parties was expressing itself in a dictum. In Richardson
Press v. Albright the promise of S was patently collateral and, there-
fore, protected by the Statute as the court held. However, we have
been forced to search the language of the court's opinion for a possi-
ble "lead" or hint as to when the court will eventually, if ever, hold S
liable upon his oral promise, even though P continues to remain liable
to C as a principal obligor.
The court's reference in Richardson Press v. Albright to S becom-
ing within the "intention of the parties, a principal obligor primarily
liable" might possibly mean either one of three things. (1) The rule of
Brown v. Weber is the law of this state; if actually S is P's surety, the
oral promise of S is unenforceable, since the liability resulting there-
from being collateral, S's duty of payment is dependent upon, and there-
fore cannot be irrespective of, the liability of P, the principal debtor.
The intention of C and S cannot change this fact. (2) The intention
of C and S, supported by a new and beneficial consideration moving
from C to S, may make S principally liable to C, irrespective of the
liability of P to C. (3) The same result as in (2) even though, as be-
tween P and S, S is surety for P. Under this last view C would appear
to be the fortunate possessor of two several original obligations, that
of P and that of S. This would be the very result seemingly attained
by application of the main purpose rule, the difference being that it is
79. For example, where the promise of P and S is joint, note 67 supra, or where C lacks
knowledge of the relationship between P and S, notes 73 and 74 supra.
80. See note 73 supra.
81. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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the intention of C and S, supported by beneficial consideration moving
from C to S, rather than the main purpose, object or motive of S in
making the promise, which brings about the result. Before conclud-
ing which, if any, of the three views the court was perhaps expressing,
we will review the remaining cases decided by the court.
The facts which earlier in this article were assumed as typical of
the problem we have been considering were presented to the court in
Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al 2 P contracted to perform
certain work for S on the premises owned by the latter. P became in-
debted to C for lumber supplied to the job and C refused further
deliveries until he was paid. Thereupon S promised that if deliveries
were continued "he would guarantee payment of what had already been
delivered, and what was to be delivered in the future." C resumed
making deliveries to P who failed to make any payments.
Here again the decision, so far as the opinion of the court discloses,
was unexceptional. The actual adjudication does not merit discussion,
but here again what was said by the court by way of exposition of its
former opinions does serve to interest anyone anxious to ascertain the
situation in which the Court of Appeals will, if ever, enforce the oral
promise of S to pay C the debt for which P is already indebted to C.
In Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al., the court observed
that "the language of the promisor unmistakably indicates its intention
to become a surety, for the very promise relied upon is that it 'would
guarantee payment.' "" As pointed out earlier, the form of such a
promise, while not always conclusive upon the application of the
Statute of Frauds, may clearly show that the promisor and promisee
understood that the promisor was merely agreeing to pay the debt of
another.
The court quotes with approval the simple and clear rule of Pro-
fessor Williston"4 that the Statute of Frauds applies to one who is a
surety and then adopts the following test from that eminent authority:
"If, as between the promisor and the original debtor, the promisor is bound
to pay, the debt is his own and not within the statute. 'Contrariwise if as between
them the original debtor still ought to pay, the debt cannot be the promisor's
own and he is undertaking to answer for the debt of another.' ",,
Without question this is the simple rule derived from the literal
language of the Statute itself, the rule announced in Brown v. Weber:
the oral promise of a surety is unenforceable. Such a rule is equally
82. 257 N.Y. 97, 177 N.E. 385 (1931).
83. Id. at 99, 177 N.E. at 385.
84. 2 WlasTo N, Co.Nmcrs § 475 (Rev. ed. 1936).
85. 257 N.Y. 97, 99, 177 N.E. 385 (1931).
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applicable whether the promise of S is made before, concurrently with,
or subsequently to the creation of P's obligation.8"
All jurisdictions recognize the above simple rule. Many jurisdictions,
however, recognize that in addition under certain circumstances a per-
son, actually a surety, may be held liable upon his oral promise under
the main purpose or beneficial consideration exceptions to the general
rule. Professor Williston, although somewhat disapprovingly, also takes
cognizance of these exceptions to the general rule."7 New York, as we
have seen, has never recognized as generally applicable the main
purpose or beneficial consideration rules as such. The nearest approach
to a general application in New York of these exceptional rules is the
test suggested in White v. Rintoul, by way of dictum as a culmination
of the previous "advances" made in New York, also made by way of
dicta.
The surprising thing about the brief opinion in Witschard et al. v.
Brody & Sons, Inc. et al. is what the court had to say in attempting to
reconcile the simple and clear position which the court was now ap-
parently taking (by way of dictum, it is true), with what the court had
said in its previous opinions. The court said concerning its quotation
from Williston:
"We find the same view expressed in Mallory v. Gillett (21 N.Y. 412, 415) and
Richardson Press v. Albright (224 N.Y. 497, 502). In the former, Comstock,
Ch. J., said that 'the inquiry under that statute is, whether there be a debtor
and a surety'; in the latter, Pound, J., said that the promise is original 'only
when the party sought to be charged clearly becomes, within the intention of the
parties, a principal debtor primarily liable.' "88
Of course, Comstock, Ch. J., said much more in Mallory v. Gillett
than quoted above. It is true that the promise in that case was held to
be unenforceable, but the majority opinion in that case clearly suggest-
ed that the receipt by C of beneficial consideration would render the
promise enforceable even though the principal debtor remained liable
to C. And in Richardson Press v. Albright, Judge Pound (who con-
86. Although in discussing this test as the "true test"' Professor Williston speaks at
times of the "original debtor" and the "new promisor," it is clear that he is suggesting a
test applicable generally to promises made before, after or concurrently with the creation
of the other person's obligation. This "true test" is the last of seven considered by the
author in the chapter dealing with the Statute of Frauds. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, c. XVI,
pp. 1307-92, particularly § 462 (Rev. ed. 1936).
87. 2 WIxsox, CONTRACTS §§ 470 and 475 (Rev. ed. 1936). The Restatement of Con-
tracts, of which Williston was the reporter, also recognizes the main purpose rule as an
exception to the general rule (REsTATE T, CONTRACTS § 184) and the Restatement
of Security follows suit. RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 93.
88. 257 N.Y. 97, 99, 177 N.E. 385 (1931).
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curred in the court's unanimous opinion in Witschard et al. v. Brody
& Sons, Inc. et al.) used the above quoted language in a context which,
as we have pointed out at some length, rendered that language sus-
ceptible of an interpretation quite different from the simple one now
ascribed to it by the court.
If there were any doubt, as has been suggested,"' whether the
language of the court in Richardson Press v. Albright is to be inter-
preted as restoring the unequivocal test suggested obiter dicta in Brown
v. Weber, the brief opinion of the court in Witschard et al. v. Brody &
Sons, Inc. et al., if it can be accepted at face value for what it says,
would seem to dispel that doubt. The court appears to have gone far
out of its way to ascribe to its opinions in one of the earliest cases
(Brown v. Weber) and in one of its more recent cases (Richardson
Press v. Albright) a view which was, at best, very much hidden in the
earlier decision and equivocally stated in the more recent decision.
The very brevity of the opinion in Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons,
Inc. et al., would lead one to believe that the Court of Appeals had
finally determined to set at rest the uncertainty which had resulted
from its former dicta. The apparently definitive and oft-quoted rule
of White v. Rintoul was not referred to nor was that case even cited.
In effect the court said: "Forget our former dicta. The Statute means
what it says. The oral promise of a surety is unenforceable. There are
no exceptions, even where the surety receives beneficial consideration and
thereby in some way comes under an independent duty of payment ir-
respective of the obligation of the principal debtor."
Consideration of two more decisions will complete a review of the
more recent decisions of the Court of Appeals. The first case which we
will consider does not involve a promise to pay an antecedent debt but
the court's holding in the case strongly bears upon the problem under
consideration.
In Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co. et al.,90 the complaint alleged
that S urged the plaintiff, C, a building contractor, to enter into a con-
tract with the P corporation for the improvement of certain premises
owned by P and promised to be answerable for payments to be made by
P to C, S representing that he was advancing the moneys necessary to
pay C, that C entered into the contract with P, completed the work and
was not paid. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff C. The Ap-
pellate Division reversed9 and upheld a defense of the Statute of Frauds,
89. Burdick, Suretyship and The Statute of Frauds, 20 Cor. L. REv. 153, 178-82 (1920).
90. 287 N.Y. 322, 39 N.E.2d 257 (1942).
91. 257 App. Div. 1040 (4th Dep't 1939).
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citing Brown v. Weber. The Court of Appeals in turn reversed the
Appellate Division in a brief per curiam opinion saying:
". .. whether this was an original undertaking to indemnify the plaintiff against
a default of Edgewater Island Park, Inc., or was a special promise to answer for
such a default and hence was within the Statute of Frauds ... were questions of
fact and were properly left to the jury," (citing Brown v. Weber and Tigho v,
Morrison).92
An examination of the record on appeal discloses that the trial court
in effect charged that to be within the Statute of Frauds the promise
of S "must have been made before the contract [between C and P] was
entered into.""3 The fact was well established that the contract was en-
tered into after- the promise of S was made and by returning a verdict
for the plaintiff under the trial court's charge the jury apparently so
found. While the above-quoted language of the Court of Appeals does
not unequivocally affirm the trial court's charge on the law, a later de-
scription of the Court of Appeals' holding in the case by the Court of
Appeals itself makes it evident that the court did base its reversal
squarely upon the position taken by the trial court in its charge to the
jury. In Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al.," the next and final case which we
will consider, the court thus refers to Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing
Co. et al.:
"There, on the plaintiff's proof, there was no liability to him of any other person
at the time defendant Schreiber Brewing Co. undertook to be his paymaster. In
that view, there was no principal obligation to which the promise could have been
collateral with the result that the promise was original, or so the jury could have
found under the charge."
Thus established by the court's own statement, the holding in Rosen-
kranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co. et al., or at least the reasons advanced
for the holding, appear, it is respectfully suggested, to be clearly erro-
neous. In principle the fact that a surety's oral promise is made, as it
frequently is in the case of most guaranties, before the principal becomes
obligated cannot remove the surety's promise from the protection of
the Statute.
This apparently fundamental error in the court's reasoning is empha-
sized by its citation of Tighe v. Morrison," which dealt with the much
disputed and discussed96 question whether the oral promise of an in-
92. 287 N.Y. 322, 325, 39 N.E.2d 257 (1942).
93. Folio 609 of the Record on Appeal.
94. 289 N.Y. 133, 140, 44 N.E. 2d 398, 402 (1942).
95. 116 N.Y. 263, 22 N.E. 164 (1889); also see Jones v. Bacon, 145 N.Y. 446, 40
N.E. 216 (1895).
96. See Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and tite Statute of Frauds: Thomas v. Cook
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demnitor to save harmless from loss one who is about to become a
surety is within the Statute of Frauds. New York, along with the great
majority of jurisdictions, holds such an oral promise is not within the
Statute of Frauds and Tighe v. Morrison is a leading authority in this
state for such holding. For purposes of the present discussion we may
prescind from a consideration as to whether that holding is correct as
a universal proposition, a question which, as we have mentioned, has
occasioned much debate. It will suffice for our present purpose to say
that a true indemnitor, unlike a surety, is one who comes under an inde-
pendent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal
debtor. 7 The basic question which has occasioned the greatest dispute
is whether in a particular case the promisor is a surety or a true indem-
nitor as just defined.
One of the reasons 8 advanced in Tighe v. Morrison for the court's
holding was that the oral promise was made before the existence of
any obligation or duty of another person."" This reasoning may have
some merit as applied to the oral promise of an indemnitor to save a
prospective surety harmless. There the only possible third-party obli-
gation involved in such a promise is the implied obligation of the princi-
pal to indemnify or reimbur§e the prospective surety should the surety
be compelled to perform the principal's duty and apparently the courts
hesitate to apply the Statute where the only obligation, other than the
promisor's, is that of a third person which shall exist only impliedly
and solely as a legal incident to the surety relationship 01
versus Green v. Cressell, 9 Al=. L. REv. 401 (1925); Carey, Guaranties and the Statute of
Frauds in Wisconsin, 2 Wisc. L. Rnv. 193, 221 (1923); Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity
and the Statute of Frauds, 41 HARv. L. REv. 689 (1928); Arant, A Rationale for the Inter-
pretation of tWe Statute of Frauds in Suretyship Cases, 12 A'... L. REv. 716, 738 (1928);
2 WuxisToe, CovaRAcrs § 482 (Rev. ed. 1936).
97. See note 114 infra.
98. "But this promise was not made to the creditor, and at the time it was made there
was no liability of the third person in existence to which it could be collateral." 116 N.1.
263, 270, 22 N.E. 164, 167 (1889).
99. The other ground advanced by the court was that the promise was not made to
the creditor. It is generally accepted that in such a case the Statute is not a defense, note
11 supra. The court said: "Moreover, the rule seems to be well settled that a promise
not made to the person entitled to enforce the liability assumed by the promisor is not
within the statute.' 116 N.Y. 263, 270, 22 N.E. 164, 167 (1889). Of course such a con-
lusion begs the question. It presumes that the liability assumed by the indemnitor is the
obligation of the principal (P) upon which the indemnified surety (S) is becoming liable
to the creditor (C), whereas, the obligation the performance of which the indemnitor
may really be guaranteeing is P's duty to reimburse or indemnify S, should the latter be
compelled to perform P's duty to C. See RESTATMF..rr, SEcURxT § 96.
100. "It is asserted that in these cases of indemnity the debt which the defendant en-
gages to discharge is that implied obligation of the third party to the promisee which
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However, as applied to the facts of a case such as Rosenkranz V.
Schreiber Brewing Co. et al., the reasoning that no third party obliga-
tion existed at the time the oral promise was made appears to be an un-
sound premise upon which to hold the Statute inapplicable. This was
recognized very early in the history of the litigation involving the Statute
of Frauds by no less a personage than Lord Mansfield. In one of the
first cases under the Statute Lord Mansfield took the view that the
Statute was inapplicable where the oral promise was made before the
obligation of P to C came into existence.101 However, a year later the
great innovator repudiated this view,' and it seems now to be fairly
well established that where S induces C to extend credit to P by orally
promising C that he will be paid, such a promise falls -exactly within
the language and spirit of the Statute. As mentioned already, this is the
fairly typical situation where a guaranty is given. In such a case the
guarantor's promise is a continuing offer for a unilateral contract or a
series of such contracts, a promise for an act. The extension by C of
credit to P constitutes the act which gives rise to the contractual liability
of S as well as that of P.03
This would appear to have been the situation in Rosenkranz v.
arises on the making of the parol promise, but it may well be doubted whether the statute
was intended to include in its operation an obligation of a third person which exists or Is
to exist solely by virtue of and as incidental to the special contract which the plaintiff
seeks to enforce. Browne, St. Fr. (5th ed.) Section 162." Note, 2 CoL. L. REV. 105
(1902). As against this view Williston points out that the Statute was intended to apply
to promises to answer for all types of obligations. 2 W Ts'oX, CoNTACTs § 452 (Rev.
ed. 1936).
101. Mawbrey v. Cunningham, Hilary Term (1773), cited in Jones v. Cooper, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1058 (1774).
102. Jones v. Cooper, 98 Eng. Rep. 1058 (1774). At an early date the New York Court
for the Correction of Errors repudiated the contention that the Statute applied solely to
the contemporaneous or prior obligations of P. Rogers et al. v. Kneeland, 13 Wend. 114,
122 (N.Y. 1834). In an earlier case, De Wolf v. Rabaud e al., 1 Pet. 476, 499 (U.S.
1828), involving the New York Statute of Frauds, Mr. Justice Story stated that the ques-
tion whether the Statute was intended to be confined in its application to a subsequent
promise to pay a pre-existing debt deser.;ed "very grave consideration" but concluded that
the question was no longer an open one. See Cowdin et al. v. Gottgetreau, 55 N.Y. 650
(1873).
103. R STATEMET, SECUPITy §§ 86 and 87; Smith v. Dann, 6 Hill 543 (N.Y. 1844);
Jordan v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168 (1877); Midland National Bank v. Security Elevator Co.
et al, 161 Minn. 30, 200 N.W. 851 (1924) ; Aitken et al. v. Lang's Adm'r el al., 106 Ky.
652, 51 S.W. 154 (1899). Cf. United States ex rel. Wilhelm et al. v. Chain, 300 U.S. 31
(1937). The fact that a guaranty, no matter how worded, unless supported by a consid-
eration, is a mere continuing offer seems to have been overlooked in Newburger el al. v.
Lubell, 266 N.Y. 4, 193 N.E. 440 (1934). Cf. Stone-Ordean Wells Co. v. Taylor, 139
Minn. 432, 166 N.W. 1069 (1918).
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Schreiber Brewing Co. et al. A reading of the record on appeal in that
case indicates that the interest of the brewing company (S) in promising
to pay C for the installation of a bar for P was to assure itself an outlet
for its beer and there is an intimation that S refused to pay C when P
started to sell the beer of a competitor. Even on the assumption that
the installation of the bar constituted beneficial consideration to the
brewing company, 1 4 the principal debt appeared to be that of the P cor-
poration, the owner of the bar, with which C had contracted to do the
work. The brewing company (S) did not appear to come under any in-
dependent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of P.10 3 The Ap-
pellate Division appears to have been justified in relying upon Brown v.
Weber, whose dictum appears to have been reaffirmed in Witschard et al.
v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al.
Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al.o0  is the last case for our review. The
facts in that case were practically the same as those in Richardson Press
v. Albright, with the exception that S owned or controlled substantially
all of the stock of P while in Richardson Press v. Albright S was charac-
terized as merely a substantial stockholder. The Appellate Division0 7
divided three to two, the majority opinion distinguishing Richardson
Press v. Albright on the basis that there S's beneficial interest was found
to be "at best remote," while in the case at hand S practically owned the
P corporation. The majority in effect applied the main purpose rule8e
citing Davis v. Patrick"9 a leading authority for that rule, even though
the majority also quoted the oft-quoted language of White v. Rintoul.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the view of the minority of the
Appellate Division that Richardson Press v. Albright was "squarely in
point"' 10 and observed that the decision in that case was not put upon
104. Similar guaranties of brewing companies have been upheld as intra vires since the
guaranty is for the benefit of the corporation. Holm v. Claus Lipsuis Brewing Co., 21
App. Div. 204, 47 N.Y. Supp 518 (2d Dep't 1897); Comment, 13 Fo.M. L. RE%,. 234,
236 (1944); N.Y. STocx CoRP. LAW § 19.
105. This conclusion might be altered by the fact that, as the record of appeal
discloses, the plaintiff had previously done similar work for the brewing company
on property owned by the brewing company and on property owned by others,
always at the brewing company's request, and that the brewing company had paid
the plaintiff for all of this work. Under such circumstances it might well be in-
ferred that, despite his contract with P, C considered that he was doing the work
for S and that so far as he was concerned S was his real debtor. If, in addition, the in-
stallation was to become S's property, then, of course, Raabe et al. v. Squier, et al., 148
N.Y. 81, 42 N.E. 516 (1895), note 45 supra, would apply.
106. 289 N.Y. 133, 44 N.E.2d 398 (1942).
107. 262 App. Div. 196, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 616 (1st Dep't 1941).
108. Id. at 197, 28 N.Y.S.2d at 617, 618.
109. 141 U.S. 479 (1891), note 16 supra.
110. 289 N.Y. 133, 136, 44 N.E.2d 398, 400 (1942).
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the ground that the promisor's beneficial interest was at best remote but
upon the broader ground that the promisor did not come "under an inde-
pendent duty of payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal
debtor."
Finally in answer to the argument of the majority of the Appellate
Division that the facts of Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al.
were distinguishable because in that case there was no identity of inter-
est between P and S, the court said:
"Assuming that to be true, although it is difficult to find a greater interest
in the subject matter of a promise that one between a promisor and a debtor
using materials to build upon property owned by the promisor for whom the
debtor was working (an interest greater than in the instant case), the case still
falls within the doctrine of Prof. Williston, quoted with approval (supra) that
'if as between them the original debtor still ought to pay, the debt cannot be
the promisor's own and he is undertaking to answer for the debt of another.' "111
THE PRESENT NEw YoRK RULE?
Upon the basis of the actual adjudications and even the language of
the most recent opinions of the Court of Appeals, commencing with that
in Richardson Press v. Albright, the conclusion seems to be inescapable
that the dictum in Brown v. Weber represents the law of New York
generally on the enforceability of the oral promise of S to pay a debt or
perform some other duty upon which P continues to be liable to C. It
is the simple rule set forth in the literal language of the Statute itself:
the oral promise of every surety is unenforceable. It is the rule applied
in two of the last cases decided by the Court of Appeals, Witschard et al.
v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al. and Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al.
Nevertheless the court went to great lengths to formulate the state-
ment of a definitive rule in White v. Rintoul and that pronouncement
cannot readily be considered, despite the court's intimation to the con-
trary in Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc. et al., to be a mere repe-
tition of the simple test announced in Brown v. Weber. While the court
failed to cite White v. Rintoul in Witschard et al. v. Brody & Sons, Inc.
et al. and Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al., it is difficult to conclude that today
the language of the opinion in that case will be considered by the court
to be either disowned or entirely meaningless.
It would be reasonable to infer that if the promisor referred to in
White v. Rintoul, who by virtue of the receipt of a new and beneficial
consideration "comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective
of the liability of the principal debtor," is truly a surety as to that
principal debtor, the dictum in White v. Rintoul must have been in-
111. Id. at 139, 44 N.E. 2d at 401.
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tended to state an exception to the general rule of Brown v. Weber, some-
thing in the nature of a substitute in New York for the main purpose
rule. However, there is little in the actual language or decisions of the
court to support such a conclusion. Though the dictum in White v. Rin-
toul does refer to the "principal debtor" in discussing the obligation of
the promisor, it would not appear that the court was thus referring by
contrast to a promisor who was something other than a "principal
debtor," i.e., a surety. The expression "principal debtor" was apparent-
ly used simply to refer to another person who was also liable to the
promisee.
Who then can such a promisor be? In this writer's opinion such a
promisor can only be an indemnitor, if we use that word in its broad
sense of an insurer against loss.112 The generally accepted definition of
such an indemnitor or insurer seems to fit the description which the court
in White v. Rintoul gave to the promisor whose oral promise might be
enforceable.3' Such an indemnitor may be defined as one who agrees
to save another person harmless from some loss, irrespective of the lia-
bility of a third person." 4
112. As used in the text the word "indemnitor" is not intended to describe a promisor
who agrees to indemnify another who is about to become a surety as in the case of
Tighe v. Morrison, note 95 supra and accompanying text, but to describe one who agrees
to compensate another person for a loss. The word "indemnify" has two meanings, one
to secure a person against loss occasioned by liability to another, and the other to make
compensation for a loss. Weller v. Eames, 15 Blinn. 461 (1870); WimsTR, NEv. It.m-
ATIo.TAL DIcio._=,Y 1093; FUNx & WAGNALLS, NEw STAND.D Dc'io:, ny 1248. The
indemnitor referred to in the text is of the latter kind.
In the suretyship relation the principal by implication of law or of fact is deemed to
have indemnified the surety against two possibilities: (1) liability and (2) loss. See
Roberts et at. v. Keene et al., 74 Misc. 238, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1091 (Sup. CL 1911).
113. Support for this conclusion may also be found in the Court's brief reference in
Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co. et al., to Brown v. Weber and Tighe v. Morrison,
quoted at page - supra. The court cited these two cases in juxtaposition to each other
apparently as representing respectively two contrasting promisors: (1) a surety whose
oral promise is collateral and hence unenforceable and (2) an indemnitor--a "paymaster,"
Bulkley et al. v. Shaw et al., 289 N.Y. 133, 140, 44 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1942)-whose oral
promise is original and, therefore, enforceable.
114. RESTATES.XXT, SECURITY § 82, comment I, defines indemnity as follows: "A con-
tract of indemnity is one where the promisor agrees to save a promisee harmless from
some loss, irrespective of the liability of a third person. In this sense, indemnity is syn-
onomous with insurance." It must be pointed out that at least one of the illustrations
given in the Restatement designated as involving a surety relationship would undoubted-
ly be treated by the courts as involving credit insurance. See note 117 infra. For exaw-
ple, the Restatement states at page 238 that where a corporation contracts with a mer-
chant to save him from loss due to the inability of customers to pay their accounts, there
is a contract of suretyship rather than one of indemnity. This would appear to be the
very situation contemplated by the dictum in White v. Rintoul where an oral agreement
would be enforceable.
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If this conclusion as to the Court's possible meaning is correct, then
the dictum of White v. Rintoul would appear to have a limited and ex-
ceptional application. It would refer solely to the case where it is the
intention of C and S that S will compensate C for a loss which may arise
upon the happening of an event, namely the non-payment of P's debt
to C, regardless of P's liability to C. n  In other words, the agreement
must contemplate that S by fulfilling his agreement will not so much be
satisfying P's debt to C as compensating C for a loss which C has
suffered as a result of P's non-payment of his debt to C. Under such
circumstances, S may not be entitled to the usual right of reimbursement
against P, which P's surety would have, since S would be merely insur-
ing C against loss without regard to P's liability. In fact S, in the case
assumed may be reimbursing C without P's knowledge or consent.11 In
this sense the agreement may be considered a form of credit insurance.
111
The fact that S may eventually be subrogated to C's claim against P
should not change the agreement into one of suretyship.118 The Restate-
115. The distinction between such an agreement and one of suretyship is noted In
Howell v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. 2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.), cert. den.,
292 U.S. 694 (1934): "A contract of indemnity is an original undertaking independent of
any collateral contract. It creates a primary liability. The promise of the Indemniltor
is not to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, but may be to make
good the loss resulting from such debt, default, or miscarriage. 28 C. J. 892; Eckhart v.
Heier, 37 S.D. 382, 158 N.W. 403; Assets Realization Co. v. Roth, 226 N.Y. 370, 123
N.E. 743; National Bank of Tifton v. Smith, 142 Ga. 663, 83 S. E. 526, L. R. A. 1915 B,
1116, 1117; 14 R.C.L. 43. While the object of a guaranty and an indemnity agreement
may be the same-to save the promisee from loss--the legal effect is different. One
guarantees the performance of an obligation according to its terms. A nonperformance
of the obligation constitutes a breach of the guaranty agreement giving rise to the lia-
bility of the guarantor. The other indemnifies against loss in case of nonperformance,
the failure to perform does not create the liability until the ascertainment of a loss
therefrom." Also see Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. el al. v. National City Bank, 6
F. 2d 762, 766 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 269 U.S. 554 (1925).
A promisor, S, may be legally bound to perform what another, P, has in fact promised
to do, even though P is not legally bound to perform. McLaughlin v. McGovern, 34 Barb.
208 (N.Y. 1861); Backus v. Feeks et al., 71 Wash. 508, 129 Pac. 86 (1913); SIMpsoN,
Ho, BOOK ON THE LAW OF SURETYSIM § 55 (1950).
116. In such a situation even if S were a surety he would not be entitled to reimburse-
ment from P. Wright v. Garlinghouse, 26 N.Y. 539 (1863); Matter of City Bank Farm-
er's Trust Co., 149 Misc. 498, 509, 268 N.Y. Supp. 554, 565 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
117. Tebbetts et al. v. Mercantile Credit Guarantee Co., 73 Fed. 95, 97 (2d Cir.
1896); American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Athens Woolen.Mills, 92 Fed. 581 (6th Cir.
1899); National Surety Co. v. Mutual Veneer Co., 66 F. 2d 88 (6th Cir. 1933); Gordon
v. Home Indemnity Co., 121 Pa. Sup. Ct. 241, 183 AtI. 427 (1936); Shakman v. United
States Credit System Co., 92 Wis. S66, 66 N.W. 528 (1896); see First National Bank
v. National Surety Co., 228 N.Y. 469, 127 N.E. 479 (1920).
118. Reid et al. v. Pauly et al., 121 Fed. 652 (9th Cir. 1903); Traveler's Insurance Co.
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ment recognizes that the rules pertaining to suretyship-and this should
include the Statute of Frauds-would not apply to the origin of the
indemnitor-indemnitee relationship, even though subsequent events may
bring the debtor into the picture. 19
While the suggested distinction between the oral promise of an in-
demnitor (compensator for a loss) which the courts will enforce and
that of a surety to which the Statute applies, may appear to be one
mostly of emphasis and intent, the distinction is one which has been
recognized by the courts. This does not mean that a promise by S to
answer for P's debt to C becomes an indemnity agreement merely be-
cause S in making his promise may have used the word "indemnify." A
promise by S to "indemnify" C against P's default may be merely an-
other form of guaranteeing P's debt.- Whether the agreement is one
of suretyship or indemnity must depend upon the substance of the
agreement between C and S which in turn must be inferred not only
from the language used but also from all of the facts and circumstances,
including their intention. One fact which would appear to be important
is the relationship-factual, not legal-between P and S when the prom-
v. Great Lakes Engineering Works Co., 184 Fed. 426 (6th Cir. 1911); Bn,.vr, Tim LAw
or SuP RYsHUp § 348 (3d ed. 1905); Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 YAm L. J.
69, 75-6 (1935).
119. RESTATEmENT, SEcURITY 237 contains the following statement: "Much of the con-
fusion which exists in connection with the administration of the rules relating to indem-
nity and suretyship can be avoided by recognizing that a contract of indemnity may
also involve suretyship as a result of subsequent events. In other words, a relationship
which involves two persons at the outset may ultimately involve three. This means that
where a contract may fairly be called on6 of indemnity or insurance, the rules pertain-
ing to suretyship do not apply to its execution, even if upon the introduction of a third
party the rules of suretyship become applicable. It should be noted, however, that where
the indemnitor becomes a surety, the indemnitee becomes the creditor and not the prin-
cipal." An excellent comment on Credit Transactions and Legal Categories, 44 YA= L. 3.
1053, 1066 (1935) dealing with the distinctions which the courts have made between
contracts of suretyship and of indemnity contains this pertinent observation: "In other
words, the distinction between suretyship and indemnity in cases of this nature is of
significance only when some question is presented for litigation, and the court feels that
the decision of that question will be aided by a resort to the distinction, in order to
attain the result desired. Hence, it is conceivable that an oral contract to answer for
the debt of another person would be treated as, and called, a contract of indemnity for
the purpose of enforcing the promisor's duty despite the statute of frauds. And yet the
same contract might be treated as one of suretyship for purposes of granting a right
of reimbursement to the third party promisor against the principal debtor."
120. Dolgaff v. Schnitzer, 209 App. Div. 511, 205 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Ist Dep't 1924);
Whitney v. Groot, 24 Wend. 82 (N.Y. 1850); also see Maine Lumber Co., Ltd. v. Mary-
land Casualty Co. et a!., 216 App. Div. 35, 214 N.Y. Supp. 621 (1st Dep't), aJ'd Trithout
opinion, 244 N.Y. 537, 155 N.E. 887 (1926). Simpson, HoL',mon on "rim LAw or
Sn --'rsnan 154 (1950).
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ise is made. In all of the cases where the promise was not enforced,
such as Richardson Press v. Albright and Witschard et al. v. Brody &
Sons, Inc. et al., the factual relationship between the promisors and the
one already indebted to C was such as practically to preclude any infer-
ence that S was doing anything other than making a suretyship agree-
ment. The relationship was such as to show a purpose or object to
guarantee P's debt rather than to compensate C against loss irrespective
of P's liability. The assurance that P would pay his debt rather than
the indemnification of C appeared to be the "main purpose" or "leading
object" of the promise by S.
A factual relationship which might give rise to a different inference
would be one where S had no connection with P and no apparent reason
to guarantee the latter's debt, but rather to assure C of payment."2' In
Rosenkranz v. Schreiber Brewing Co. et al., there may possibly have
been a basis for furnishing some plausibility to a finding that S intended
to indemnify C (as the jury apparently found) rather than to guarantee
payment of P's debt. 2   Unfortunately, as pointed out above, the court
in that case appears to have posited its decision upon a seemingly irrele-
121. Such a situation would exist where S's promise to pay P's debt is made in con-
nection with the assignment by S to C of P's indebtedness to S. See note 13 supra. In
such a case the debt from P to S, whether represented by a note or some other fokm of
contract, is being sold by S to C, and in effect S, by guaranteeing that P will pay, Is
warranting the worth of the thing sold as would any vendor of a chattel. In this respect
S is promising to indemnify-in the sense of compensating-C for any loss which C may
suffer as a result of the non-payment of the debt by P. That such is the case is apparent
from the following observations made by the Court of Appeals. In Brown v. Curtiss,
2 N.Y. 225 (1849), the court said: "Although in form this is a promise to answer for
the debt of another, in substance it is an agreement to pay the guarantors debt In a par-
ticular way. He does not undertake as a mere surety for the maker, but on his own
account, and for a consideration which has its root in a transaction entirely distinct
from the liability of the maker. The defendant was a debtor of the plaintiff, and gave
the note with the guaranty to satisfy that debt." (Italics added). In Cardell v. McNeil,
21 N.Y. 336 (1860), S, in payment for goods purchased from C, transferred to C the
note of P in which S was named as payee. The court said: "It is claimed that the guar-
anty is void by the Statute of Frauds. In mere form it was certainly a collateral under-
taking, because it was a promise that another person should perform his obligation, but
looking to the substance of the transaction, we see that the defendant ES] paid, In this
manner, a part of the price of a horse sold to himself. In a sense merely formal, he
agreed to answer for the debt of Cornell [P]. In reality he undertook to pay his own
vendor so much of the price of the chattel, unless a third person should make the pay-
ment for him." Id. at 339.
In both of the above cases S was not actually interested in P's payment of the debt
assigned by S to P except to the extent that such payment would relieve S of his inde-
pendent duty to C, irrespective of P's liability to C, to see that C was paid.
122. See note 105 supra.
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vant fact, namely, that the promise of S was made before the indebted-
ness of P to C arose.
It must be acknowledged that the suggested explanation-in an effort
to find one--of who is the promisor referred to in White v. Rintoid, who
"comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the lia-
bility of the principal debtor" would not satisfy those who would, for
all purposes, place the surety and the indemnitor in exact categories to
be determined solely by the objective facts and who would hold that the
suretyship relation exists, regardless of the intention of the parties, when-
ever performance by S would be the performance of P's duty"3 Never-
theless, other courts have not hesitated to depart from an observance
of such strict and inflexible categories in order to enforce oral promises
where justice and the spirit of the Statute would seem to require it.124
There is no reason to assume that our Court of Appeals, in a proper
case, will be any more hesitant and will not some day give a concrete
meaning to the language of White v. Rintoid.
CONCLUSION
We can only speculate as to the true meaning of the test laid down in
White v. Rintoul until such time as the Court of Appeals is called upon
to hold enforceable the oral promise of one, who, in the court's opinion,
has come "under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the lia-
bility of the principal debtor." It is questionable whether any future
expression obiter dicta of the court's understanding of the language of
White v. Rintoul will clarify the law any better in the future than it has
in the past. One other possible source of clarification would be legisla-
tion, but it does not appear that a subject involving such nice and subtle
123. See Williston's statement quoted in note 42 supra.
124. "Ignoring, however, the vagueness of the tests as to whether or not a contract is
'independent,' and its subordinate tests of whether the promisor received a 'new consid-
eration' or had a 'leading object,' it is apparent that in many of the cases where the
promisor's promise is called independent, and his promise held enforceable, a tripartite
relationship exists, factually speaking. This is because the nature of the condition prece-
dent to the third party's liability is the default of another person, the principal debtor,
and this liability is discharged if the principal pays. It appears, therefore, that there is
no real distinction in these cases, in the sense that the courts talk of the distinction,
which can ever be used as a means of understanding the cases. The explanation for these
cases, and hence the explanation of what the distinction is between suretyship and in-
demnity, is based on a recognition of the reason why the distinction is made, rather than
on how it is made. The real identifying earmarks of the cases placed in the 'indemnity'
category may often be found in the fact that the evidence showing the existence of the
alleged oral contract is so clear that justice requires its enforcement." Comment, 44 YALE
L.J. 1053, 1058-9 (1935).
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distinctions can be properly and appropriately dealt with by the enact-
ment of clarifying legislation, unless it were to take the form of the
outright adoption for New York State of the main purpose rule. If the
more recent decisions of the Court of Appeals disclose any one thing
with certainty, it is that the public policy of our state, as interpreted by
the Court of Appeals, is against adoption of that broad rule.
